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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VOTING PROVISIONS IN
THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION
The seventeenth amendment to the state constitution provides Wash-
ington with one of the most restrictive property tax systems in the
nation.1 Under its provisions the aggregate of tax levies upon real and
personal property in any given taxing district may not exceed forty
mills on the dollar of assessed valuation in any one year. Moreover,
the forty mill limit may be exceeded only when three fifths of the
electors voting authorize an excess levy. The amendment further pro-
vides that the election is not valid unless the number of persons voting
constitutes not less than forty per cent of the total number of votes
cast in the taxing district in the last preceding general election.2
A traditional concept equates democracy with majority rule. The
seventeenth amendment rejects this notion insofar as it allows a minor-
ity of the voting public to thwart the will of the voting majority in two
ways: by casting a "no" vote the minority can defeat the excess levy
because of the sixty per cent requirement, by staying away from the
polls the minority can defeat the measure because of the forty per cent
requirement. Obviously proponents of excess levies have a more diffi-
cult task than do opponents. This is to say that the seventeenth
amendment protects property owners from the threat of taxes in excess
of forty mills. Whether the inequality thus created falls within the
prohibition of the equal protection clause of the federal constitution3
'For a survey of limitations in other states see League of Women Voters of
Wash., Facts and Issies: The 40%-60% Voting Requirement, Pub. No. EL-5, (1966).
See generaly ADVISORY CoMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CON-
STITTiONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOcAL TAXING POWERs (1962) [here-
inafter cited as RESrIucTloNs oN LocAL TAXING POWERS].
'WASH. CONsT. art. 7, § 2, amend. 17 (1944) provides in part:
Forty Mill Limit. Except as hereinafter provided and notwithstanding any
other provisions of this constitution, the aggregate of all tax levies upon real
and personal property by the state and all taxing districts now existing or
hereinafter created shall not in any year exceed forty mills on the dollar at
assessed valuation, which assessed valuation shall be fifty percentum of the true
and fair value of such property in money.... Such aggregate limitation or any
specific limitation imposed by law in conformity therewith may be exceeded
only
(a) by any taxing district when specifically authorized so to do by a majority
of at least three-fifths of the electors thereof voting on the proposition to levy
such additional tax... either at a special election or at the regular election
of such taxing district, at which election the number of persons voting on the
proposition shall constitute not less than forty per centum of the total number
of votes cast in such taxing district at the last preceding general election.
'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
[ VOL. 42: 621
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
is a question which has been raised but never litigated.4
The most dramatic growth of the equal protection clause has been
in the category of cases dealing with the "basic civil rights of man."'
This category has been extended by the Baker v. Carr6 line of cases
to protect the right to the franchise and ensure that one vote will
"weigh" as much as another.7 The recognition of the franchise as a
basic civil right of man and therefore a proper subject for the applica-
tion of the equal protection clause suggests that the inequities in the
"forty-sixty" voting requirements of the seventeenth amendment to
the state constitution may deny equal protection to proponents of
excess levies. When such discrimination exists, the test by equal pro-
tection standards is whether the inequality represents simply arbitrary
and capricious action or whether, on the other hand, it pursues some
legitimate policy end.s
'See 65-66 OPs. WASn. ATey'y GENx. No. 83 (1966). The Attorney General con-
cluded that the 40% requirement of the seventeenth amendment does not conflict with
the "one man, one vote!' principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in its equal
protection cases involving legislative apportionment. See note 7 infra.
'In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), the
Supreme Court invalidated an Oldahoma statute providing for the sterilization of
habitual criminals and declared the equal protection clause to be a defender of "the
basic civil rights of man." Since its adoption in 1868 as a measure to assure equal
protection to negroes, The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), it has been
extended in scope far beyond the application contemplated by its drafters and is now
used to strike down many forms of discrimination, most of which involve civil
rights. See note 8 infra. The equal protection clause is infrequently used to strike
down economic discrimination, the other "category" of equal protection cases; only
when the discrimination is totally arbitrary will the Court intervene to adjust the
inequities. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (invalidated statutory exemp-
tion of American Express from regulations applying to all other issuers of money
orders). In a great majority of the cases, the Court will uphold state economic
regulation against an equal protection challenge. See McKay, Political Thickets and
Cray Quilts: Reapportionmnent and Equal Protection, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 645 (1963).
6369 U.S. 186 (1962).7See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), which declared that the equal pro-
tection clause requires that both houses of state legislatures be apportioned substan-
tially on a population basis; the Court upheld an apportionment scheme based on the
number of registered voters because it produced a distribution of legislators not
substantially different from that which would have resulted from use of population as
a base. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court concluded that malap-
portionment in Alabama denied the right of suffrage to voters by debasement or
dilution of the vote, and announced a "population base" test for apportionment
schemes. In Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), it was held that the "county unit
system" in Georgia discriminated against people on the basis of where in the
geographical unit they happened to live; the Court announced the "one man, one vote"
principle. Baker v. Carr, supra note 6, was the first apportionment case, which held
to be justiciable a claim that malapportionment constitutes irrational and arbitrary
state action.
' Deciding what policy objectives are "legitimate" is made somewhat difficult by
the Supreme Court's practice of using such imprecise generalities as "invidious dis-
crimination," e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955), or
"arbitrary and capricious" action, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), when
rejecting various state or state supported activities as violative of the equal protec-
tion clause. In part, the practice results from the fact that the construction of the
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Analagous to Washington's protection of property owners was New
Hampshire's practice of making the amount of taxes paid a factor in
the delineation of constituencies in the upper house of the state legisla-
ture.' The justification for providing the landed interests with weighted
representation was protection from legislation prejudicial to their in-
terests which might be adopted by the legislature in the absence of such
protection.' Because protection for property owners is offered as justi-
fication for the seventeenth amendment," the following comment about
the New Hampshire practice should apply equally well to that amend-
ment: 12
This is of course not the way of democracy. Here, perhaps even more
clearly than in the case of utilizing geography as a factor, the amount of
direct taxes paid should not be permitted as a partial, let alone exclusive,
determinant of the proportion of representation to which a district might
be entitled.
Professor McKay's opinion that protection afforded property owners
by a legislative apportionment scheme does not pursue a legitimate
policy objective by equal protection standards suggests that a similar
argument might be used to attack the seventeenth amendment: the
"forty-sixty" requirements imposed on the electorate to protect the
special interests of property owners have no place in the lawmaking
clause lends itself to use as a conclusory, catchall provision to attack any discrimina-
tory action. See McKay, supra note 5. Some predictability is possible, however, by
examining the ways in which the equal protection clause has been applied. In
general, the Court will rarely use it to intervene in matters of economic regulation.
See note 5 supra. But in matters affecting civil rights, the Court will demand the
state justify discrimination against negroes, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954), aliens, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), criminals, e.g., Smith
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), and Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942), or voters, e.g., Burns v. Richardson, supra note 7.
'N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 26 (1877) provides:
And that the state may be equally represented in the senate, the legislature shall,
from time to time divide the state into twenty-four districts...; and in making
this division, they shall govern themselves by the proportion of direct taxes paid
by the said districts ....
"
0 McKay, supra note 5.
"During the depression Washington responded to losses in property values and
property income by tightening the property tax limits and relieving the tax pressure
on property owners. The forty mill limit was first passed in 1932 as Initiative
Measure No. 64. See RESTIcTiOws oN LOcAL TAXING POWERS.
'McKay, supra note 5, at 696. Apparently the Supreme Court and the voters of
New Hampshire agreed with Professor McKay. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533(1964), the Court held population to be the only legitimate base for legislative ap-
portionment In the same year the voters of New Hampshire amended part two of the
constitution to provide "And that the state may be equally represented in the senate,
the legislature shall divide the state into single-member districts, as nearly equal
as may be in population,.. .
[ VOL. 42: 621
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process' 3 of a democratic society governed by the principles of major-
ity rule. State and federal precedent suggests, however, that the voting
requirements of the amendment are constitutional.
Where state constitutions or statutes prescribe the minimum favor-
able votes essential to the passage of a special election proposal, they
typically require such proposals to be passed by a stated percentage
of "the qualified voters of the town,"' 4 or a "majority of the qualified
electors of such city,"'1 or "a majority of the legal voters within such
district."' 6 Some courts construe such provisions as requiring approval
of the majority of legal voters actually voting on the theory any other
construction would be impractical and make passage at the polls too
difficult.' 7  The more restrictive view interprets such provisions as
requiring approval by the majority of the persons lawfully entitled to
vote regardless of whether they vote in fact.' S Comparatively, such
a construction renders a proponent's task more onerous than the forty
per cent requirement of the Washington Constitution. For, achieving
a forty per cent turnout of voters who voted in the last general election
involves getting less people to the polls than does achieving a fifty per
cent turnout of the entire voter group.
Courts which adopt the less restrictive view have been more sensitive
to the negative effect the stricter interpretation is bound to have on
the success of proposals at the polls. The United States Supreme
Court prefers the less restrictive view because any other construction
would allow an indifferent minority of qualified voters to thwart the
purpose of the election by refusal to exercise the franchise.' 9 In Carroll
County v. Smith,2 ° the Court stated that unless the legislature clearly
' When exercising the franchise with regard to excess levies, voters are, no
doubt, functioning as lawmakers.
"E.g., Mo. Adjourned Sess. Laws 1868, § 1, at 93. See County of Cass v. Johnston,
95 U.S. 360 (1877).
'E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 12, § 843 (1949). See Clayton v. Hill City,
111 Kan. 595, 207 Pac. 770 (1922).
"
0E.g., LAWS OF MAINE 1903, ch. 82, § 12, and ch. 194, § 1. See Foy v. Gardiner
Water Dist., 98 Me. 82, 56 Atl. 201 (1903).
' E.g., Foy v. Gardiner Water Dist., supra note 16.
'Clayton v. Hill City, 111 Kan. 595, 207 Pac. 770 (1922). In State ex rel.
Blankenship v. Gaines, 136 Wash. 610, 241 Pac. 12 (1925), the Washington court
upheld a restrictive interpretation of a statutory provision which read, "if the vote
be a majority of the registered voters of said city or town .... " The statute was in-
terpreted as requiring a majority of all registered voters and not merely a majority
of the registered voters actually voting. See e.g., Madison v. Wade, 88 Ga. 699, 16
S.E. 21 (1892); Hobgood v. Catahoula Parish, 147 La. 279, 84 So. 656 (1920);
Williamson v. Aldrich, 21 S.D. 13, 108 N.W. 1063 (1906).
See Virginia Ry. v. System Fed. 40, AFL, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
I' 111 U.S. 556 (1883).
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expresses a contrary intention, such language as "qualified voters" will
be interpreted as referring only to those who actually vote. Carroll,
however, definitely intimates that while the restrictive type statute is
not preferred it would be upheld if the legislature's intent is unam-
biguous. By this standard the Court would accept the restrictive
provisions of the seventeenth amendment to the Washington Consti-
tution.
By the equal protection standards established in the apportionment
cases stemming from Baker v. Carr, the acceptability of these provi-
sions seems questionable. In order to strike them down, however, the
Court would have to distinguish the substantial body of opinion sup-
porting such limitations2 and in some way dispose of its position in
Carroll. This could be accomplished by simply pointing out that the
Carroll precedent dates from the pre-Baker era when such things as
malapportionment were nonjusticiable and that outmoded historical
precedent should not be allowed to retard or prevent a logical extension
of the law.22 Such an argument assumes that the apportionment cases
provide authority which can be used to invalidate a variety of voting
restrictions not affecting apportionment. The context in which the
voting requirements of the seventeenth amendment arise, however,
seem to make the Baker v. Carr analogy a questionable one.
The federal courts have adopted a far more permissive attitude
toward state schemes of taxation than toward schemes of legislative
apportionment. Whereas in the apportionment area the equal protec-
tion test is clear-legislatures must be apportioned substantially on a
population basis23-- there is considerably more flexibility in the equal
protection test for taxation--classifications must not be simply arbi-
trary. Instead, they must have a reasonably conceivable purpose and
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.24
See note 18 supra.
Some post-Baker v. Carr authority exists which upholds voting restrictions
which could defeat a measure approved by a majority of the voters voting. In Opin-
ion of the Justices, 210 A.2d 683 (Me. 1965), the state supreme court approved a
requirement that the number of votes cast in the election must be at least 20% of the
total vote for all candidates for governor cast in the municipality at the last guber-
natorial election. If the validation requirement is not satisfied the election is void.
'Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533(1964).
' See Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959), where the Court also
said: "That a statute may discriminate in favor of a certain class does not render
it arbitrary if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction or
difference in state policy." Accord, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961),
where the Court held it was not unreasonable to permit only certain merchants within
a county to sell merchandise on Sunday. The legislature could conceivably find the
[ VOL. 42 : 621
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Thus, the state is not acting arbitrarily when it exempts non-resi-
dents from a warehouse tax which residents have to pay where the
scheme aims to encourage industries to come into the state. Without
this purpose the exemption would be unconstitutional as one arbitrarily
discriminating on the basis of residence. 25 Likewise, where exempting
lessees of state owned property from a tax which lessees of federally
owned property have to pay could not be justified by any significant
difference between them, the exemption is unconstitutional.26 In short,
there is no "iron rule of equality prohibiting flexibility and variety.
2 7
The "taxation" equal protection test suggests that the restrictive
provisions of the seventeenth amendment fall within the state's broad
discretion. The basic aim of the seventeenth amendment is to restrict
taxation of real property in any given taxing district to forty mills per
year. The voting provisions anticipated situations where the limita-
tions would prove too restrictive and additional funds would be re-
quired. To accommodate such situations election machinery was pro-
vided; but consonant with the spirit of the amendment, the provisions
drawn were restrictive. In this context it appears that the voting
requirements do not discriminate arbitrarily against proponents, but
instead provide a safety valve should the forty mill limit prove too
confining. Indeed, if the legitimacy of the voting provisions should
depend upon the legitimacy of the purpose of the amendment-to
relieve tax pressure from property owners-the voting provisions would
survive constitutional attack.28
It is submitted, however, that the constitutionality of the "forty-
sixty" voting requirements should not depend upon the rationality
of the particular scheme of which they are a part but, instead, should
be determined independently by a separate standard. As voting pro-
visions they fit into neither the taxation nor the apportionment equal
protection area exclusively. They create an instance for the exercise
of the franchise but do not affect legislative representation; they are
included as part of the state's taxation scheme but only collaterally,
providing relief should the forty mill limit prove too restrictive. Instead
of attempting to classify the voting restrictions as either taxation or
commodities necessary for the health and recreation of the citizens and permit them
to be sold only in areas where they are most likely to be put to use. "A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify it." Id. at 426.
-Allied Stores v. Bowers, supra note 24.
- Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1960).
"'Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526 (1959).
1 See note 24 supra.
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apportionment, it would be more efficacious to evaluate them in terms
of general equal protection doctrine.
An inquiry into the constitutionality of the greater-than-majority
voting requirements would expose the nature and effect of the inequi-
ties created and would force consideration of possible justifications
for them. To be constitutional the voting requirements must be ra-
tional rather than arbitrary. The earlier discussion demonstrated that
"rationality" is an illusive concept construed both strictly, as in the
apportionment cases, and liberally, as in the taxation context. What
would constitute irrational and therefore unconstitutional requirements
in the greater-than-majority voting context is best illustrated by a
hypothetical situation: a majority of state legislators attempt to per-
petuate control by passing a law requiring legislative candidates to
poll ninety per cent of the vote to unseat incumbents. Such an attempt
to establish minority control would doubtless be countered with a
strong equal protection argument, despite dicta that legislatures may
increase the percentage of votes required by state constitutions to
approve election measures.29 Indeed, these same legislators may
attempt to ensure re-election by enacting a law requiring that to
validate the election forty per cent of those voting in the last general
election must vote and sixty per cent of those voting must favor the
candidate challenging the incumbent. This seems to be an arrangement
as equally indefensible as the ninty per cent requirement.
In the context of this hypothetical election, the "forty-sixty" require-
ments are impossible to justify. Whether the requirements are less
offensive in the case of the seventeenth amendment simply because
the latter concerns excess levies rather than legislative elections is the
crucial question. Certainly the argument can be made that if it is
invidious discrimination to protect special interests when delineating
legislative districts, ° it is no less invidious to "weigh" votes3' because
'E.g., Robb v. Tacoma, 175 Wash. 580, 28 P.2d 327 (1933). The "election mea-
sures" involved in this case and others in accord do not affect legislative representa-
tion but, instead, concern such matters as approval of bonded indebtedness, Bauch v.
City of Cabol, 165 Mo. App. 486, 148 S.W. 1003 (1912), and authorization of munici-
palities to finance industrial aid projects, Opinion of the Justices, 210 A.2d 683
(Me. 1965).
" The reference here is to the pre-1964 New Hampshire scheme of legislative
apportionment. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964), holding that apportionment must be based substantially on popula-
tion, indicate that the Supreme Court would share Professor McKay's view of the
discarded New Hampshire scheme. See McKay, supra note 5.
1The "forty-sixty" voting requirements do not "weigh" votes in the same
sense as malapportioned legislative districts, by arbitrarily providing one man with
greater representation in government than another; but they do distort the election
[ VOL. 42: 621
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the subject of the election is a tax levy rather than a legislative candi-
date. The practical result may be the same in either case.
The apportionment cases would seem to support the conclusion
that protection for particular interests should not be built into the
lawmaking process to make that process work easier for one group
than for another. Those cases require that both houses of state legisla-
tures be devoid of weighted representation for special interests before
they may legitimately conduct the business of government.3 2  By
analogy, if legislators may not constitutionally function as lawmakers
when the legislative machinery is weighted to protect special interests,
it seems equally unconstitutional to allow electors to function as law-
makers when the election machinery is so weighted. That the "forty-
sixty" voting requirements exist as part of a scheme which pursues a
legitimate objective by other tests, as protection for property owners
may satisfy the taxation equal protection test, is irrelevant. In this
particular inquiry the only matter of concern is the process by which
it is decided to follow one course rather than another and whether,
within this process, there ought to be limitations upon the democratic
principle of majority rule.
Such limitations are objectionable in varying degrees depending, in
part, upon their function. There is a strong argument, for example, in
defense of restricting the ease with which the federal constitution
may be altered, for it defines the scope of the government's jurisdiction.
Because it constitutes the foundation of the federal system and enu-
merates things no government can do, there are, written in, obstacles
to the changing of the document. "There are things not even a major-
ity may require government to do because they are outside the jurisdic-
tion of any government."33
Other limitations, however, are more offensive, as in the case of the
hypothetical election where the restrictions served to perpetuate con-
trol by incumbents. The important characteristic in that situation may
process by selecting out those individuals predisposed to vote against excess levies
and providing them with a decided advantage. This is "weighing" votes in a some-
what different sense.
"In Forston v. Morris, 87 Sup. Ct. 446 (1966), the Supreme Court held that
electing a governor is a legitimate function of a state legislature if the state con-
stitution so provides, as does the Georgia Constitution, GA. CONST. art. 5, § 1. It
also allowed the malapportioned Georgia legislature to perform this function but the
approval was qualified: "In Toombs v. Forston, 384 U.S. 210, affirming 241 F. Supp.
65, we held that with certain exceptions not here material, the Georgia Assembly
could continue to function until May 1, 1968. Consequently the Georgia Assembly is
not disqualified to elect a Governor as required by Art. V of the state's constitution."
COMMAGER, MAJoR Ty RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTs 8 (1950).
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be that the limitation undermines the spirit of representative govern-
ment and is, therefore, a fundamental deviation from our form of
democracy. Less dramatic examples, such as the "forty-sixty" voting
requirements, are equally anti-democratic but more readily accepted.
This may be due in part to a philosophical acceptance of other anti-
democratic limitations, such as judicial review, and a belief that some
checks on majority rule are necessary.3 4
The argument against the constitutionality of Washington's seven-
teenth amendment must confront this question of political philosophy.
It is not enough to demonstrate that a practice is anti-democratic, for
many institutions in our federal system were born from fear of a
"tyranny of the majority" and created to restrict majority rule. 3 All
such practices and institutions are not ipso facto unconstitutional.
Some, however, are more vulnerable than others because they are
demonstrably arbitrary, the apportionment cases providing the best
and most recent examples. Discrimination in the case of Washington's
seventeenth amendment seems no less arbitrary than that which
prompted the apportionment decisions, but it is certainly less vital.
The argument remains, however, that when voters cast their ballots
they ought to have an equal voice in the outcome of the matters before
them and ought not be categorized beforehand according to their dispo-
sition to vote on one side or the other.
While the voting provisions of the state's seventeenth amendment
appear vulnerable to an equal protection argument, 36 as a practical
"To protect against the "tyranny" of government the framers of the Constitution
provided for the "checks and balances of the federal system, of the tripartite division
of powers, of the bicameral legislatures, of frequent elections and of impeachment
... [A]top all this there developed ... the practice of judicial review." COMMIAGER,
op cit. supra note 33, at 6.
The fundamental question of the extent to which the will of the majority ought to
be restricted is a question of political philosophy and the basic consideration is the
confidence one has in the ability of the majority to function fairly without such
restrictions. For conflicting views see DEToQuEvI.LE, DEoCRACy iN' A mErcA (1840),
and THE WRiTI GS OF THOMAS JEFmmsoN (1925). Stated differently, to what extent
and when should the minority be provided with safeguards in addition to those in-
corporated in the federal system? Any limitation is, of course, anti-democratic and
ought to be avoided in the absence of demonstrable need for it. One aspect of the
question in Washington, then, is whether the restrictive provisions of the seven-
teenth amendment are philosophically defensible. Those who share a fear of the
"tyranny of the majority," THE FEDnatALIST No. 51 (Madison), ought to be prepared
to present a case for the necessity of the limitations. Consideration should be given
to whether there are adequate safeguards without the voting restrictions. Judicial
review, for example, may provide sufficient protection to make additional measures
unnecessary.
"See text accompanying note 34 supra.
"Assuming, arguendo, that the seventeenth amendment, including its voting pro-
visions, is constitutional, it would not be made more desirable by its legitimacy.
In addition to the imposition of minority control, other inequities are created.
[ VOL. 42: 621
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matter it may be imprudent to wait for the judiciary to strike them
down. Because in this state the voting restrictions combine with
inequitable assessment practices and other inefficiencies created as
by-products of the property tax system,37 the most inspired remedy
would be major constitutional reform.
COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION-
A COPYRIGHT INFRINGER
Plaintiff licensed its copyrighted motion pictures to a television
broadcasting station. Defendant, a Community Antenna Television'
(CATV) System, received the station's broadcast, amplified the signal,
Because the 40% validation requirement is based on the last preceding general
election, i.e. the last general election in the district, absurd disparities result. See
Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Odell, 54 Wn. 2d 728, 344 P.2d 715 (1959) and see 59-60
WASH. Ops. ATT'Y. GEN. No. 133 (1960). In Seattle, for example, the 1965 excess
levy required 106,000 votes for validation because the last general election happened
to be the 1964 presidential election; the 1966 excess levy required only 40,500 votes for
validation because only 101,000 votes were cast in the last (1965) general election.
See WASHINGTO,, EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH IN EDUCATION Vol. 9, No. 3
(1966). Such indefensible disparity results from the totally arbitrary nature of this
aspect of the system.
Additional inequities result from the county assessors' disregard of the constitu-
tional mandate to assess at fifty per cent of true value of the property. See WASH.
CONST. art. 7, § 2, amend. 17 (1944). Not one assessor in the state satisfies the
constitutional requirement, see VASHINGTON STATE TAX COMISSlION, COUNTY
RATIO EQUALIZATION STUDY: 1966 ASSESSMIENT (1966), and since Clark v. Seiber,
48 Wn. 2d 783, 296 P2d 680 (1956), where the state supreme court invalidated an
effort by the legislature to give the state board of equalization the power to bring
valuations closer to the fifty per cent requirement, the matter has remained com-
pletely under the control of individual assessors, who demonstrate no willingness to
change. Subsequent efforts by the state to bring assessment practices into con-
formity with the constitutional requirement have been merely persuasive and not
very effectual, see Harsh, 7he WIashington Tax System-How It Grew, 39 WASH.
L. REv. 944 (1965), with the result, inter alia, that property of residents in one tax-
ing district is assessed at a different rate than property of residents in other taxing
districts. See Comment, 66 UTAH L. REV. 491 (1966), for a discussion of assessment
practices strikingly similar to those in Washington and for a discussion of recom-
mended changes. See also Tiedman, Fractional Assessments-Do Our Courts Sane-
tion Ilquality?, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 573 (1965), for a discussion of the inequities
created by fractional assessment. A harmful side effect of the assessment practices
in Washington has been the frequent need to resort to the excess levy as a source of
revenue for the individual taxing districts. See WASHINGTON EDUCATION AssocIA-
TION, RESEARCH iN EDUCATION Vol. 9, No. 3 (1966) for an indication of the scope of
the reliance throughout the state on the excess levy as a source of revenue.
' See text accompanying note 36 supra.
'Community Antenna Television (CATV) systems are a communications ad-
vancement which allows television reception in fringe areas where reception would
be virtually impossible without a CATV system. CATV systems are a burgeoning
industry. In January 1965 there were 1,600 systems in the United States and the
number has been increasing at a rate of approximately forty systems per month.
Hearings Before the Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 8, pt. 1, at 35 (1966).
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